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First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles: JUST COMPENSATION OR
DUE PROCESS REVIEW FOR
TEMPORARY REGULATORY
TAKINGS.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution expressly
prohibits the taking of private property for a public use without just
compensation.' Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision
of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles,2 the California Supreme Court held that the exclusive
remedy for a regulatory taking is invalidation of the regulation or
injunctive relief. 3 Therefore, the property owner would not be com-
pensated for the loss of use of the property until after a court
determines whether the regulation is invalid.4 In First English, the
United States Supreme Court defined a temporary regulatory taking
as a taking which occurs during the period of time from the enactment
of a regulation until a judicial determination that the regulation is
invalid. 5 The Court ruled that temporary regulatory takings are
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. ("Nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation").
2. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
3. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 378 (1979) aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Under this rule, property
owners are not entitled to compensation for the period prior to a determination that the
regulation is unconstitutional. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 658 (1981) (Brennan, J. dissenting); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (1987).
4. See San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
5. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85. Temporary takings differ from other takings in
that later governmental actions may end the taking. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
compensable under the just compensation clause of the fifth amend-
ment when such takings deprive a property owner of all reasonable
use of the property.6
Part I of this note sets forth the legal background of the regulatory
taking issue.7 Part II discusses the facts, holding, and rationale of
the First English case.' Finally, Part III discusses the possible legal
ramifications of the First English opinion. 9
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Governmental entities are prohibited from taking private property
for a public use without providing just compensation to the property
owner. 10 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution also prohibits any State from depriving
any person of property without due process of law. The United
States Supreme Court has not specifically decided whether a valid
health, safety, or welfare regulation which satisfies the due process
clause may still be a taking under the fifth amendment just compen-
sation clause.' 2
6. Id. at 2389. Therefore, a private property owner may collect monetary damages from
a government entity for a regulatory taking prior to a judicial determination that the regulation
is invalid. Id.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 10-121.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 121-66.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 167-203.
10. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
allows the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment to be applied to the states. Chicago
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). The California Constitution similarly
requires that just compensation must be awarded for property taken by the state. CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 19. This section states: "Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use
only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or
into the court, for the owner." Id. The fifth amendment is commonly referred to as the just
compensation clause. See First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389; 1 SHONIWCWER & MORAN, LAND
USE LITGATON, § 2.05(2), 101 (1986) [hereinafter SHONKW11ER & MORAN]. Monetary damages
can be recovered for deprivation of the use under the just compensation clause). Id. at I11.
11. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. (That amendment states in pertinent part: "Nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.") This is
commonly referred to as the due process clause. See First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389;
SHONXWER & MORAN, supra note 10, at 101 (1986). Under the due process theory, the
landowner's remedy is limited to invalidation of the regulation. Id. at 111. Also, regulatory
taking claims may be premised upon Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 112.
Under section 1983, actual damages might be awarded for due process violations. Id.
12. See SHONKWIER & MORAN, supra note 10, at 105 (1986). Cf. Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.
Ct. 1232 (1987). In addition, the Supreme Court has also not decided the proper remedy for
regulatory takings. See infra notes 70-121 and accompanying text; Roberts, Los Angeles Test
Case for Zoning Curbs Argued, L.A. Daily J., January 15, 1987. The Supreme Court has not
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A. Eminent Domain and Inverse Condemnation
Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to institute formal
judicial proceedings to acquire private property for public use without
prior consent by the property owner." Formal proceedings initiated
by the government 14 are referred to as eminent domain proceedings. 15
In an eminent domain proceeding, the government initiates a judicial
action against the property owner to take the fee simple or lesser
interest in the property and pays the landowner just compensation
as required by the fifth amendment. 16 When the government has not
initiated formal eminent domain proceedings to acquire private prop-
erty, a landowner may bring an inverse condemnation action to
obtain just compensation for the taking.' 7 An eminent domain action
decided the remedy issue because of the lack of a final determination in four cases since 1980.
See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer and Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego
Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980). See also Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto:
A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings of
Property, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 685, 695 (1986) [hereinafter A Reply] (proposing that regulatory
takings require just compensation); Siemon, Mandelker, & Babcock, The White River Junction
Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193, 194 (1984) [hereinafter The Manifesto] (proposing that regulatory
takings do not require just compensation).
13. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638, n.2 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 6 J. SACKmAN, NICHOLS' LAW OF EMINENT DoUsAn' § 1.11, at
1-7 (rev. 3d ed. 1980). The term "eminent domain" originated in the early 17th century and
was regarded as an inherent and necessary power of government by the colonies. SHoNKvwLER
& MORAN, supra note 10, at 101-02 (noting that the term "police power" was not in general
usage until the mid-19th century when it was formulated in Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass.
(7 Cush.) 53, 86 (1851)); F. BossEauAN, D. CALUEs & J. BANTA, THE TA X IssuE 82-104
(1973).
14. The eminent domain power may be exercised by city, county, state, or federal agencies.
See SHONKWILER & MoRAN, supra note 10, at 101 (1986).
15. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2386 (1987) ("While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn
property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of inverse
condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal
proceedings.").
16. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 638 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2.
17. Agins, 447 U.S. at 258 n.2. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 638
n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Inverse condemnation is defined as a cause of action against a
governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even thought no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain
has been attempted by the taking agency. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1979);
D. HAGaNi , URANr PLANmo AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328 (1971). In an
inverse condemnation action, the condemnation is "inverse" because the landowner, rather
than the governmental entity, institutes the proceeding. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S.
at 638 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse
condemnation as a result of "the self-executing character" of the just compensation clause of
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will not be filed when the government does not view the public use
of the property as a taking. 18 The government may, nevertheless, be
liable to the landowner for just compensation if the court determines
that the property was taken for a public use. 9
B. Zoning and Regulatory Takings
The concept of zoning arose from the common law tort of nuisance
which recognized certain restrictions on the right to use land in ways
which interfere with adjacent land.20 Courts expanded these restric-
tions to allow zoning to promote the general health and safety of
the public. 21 Today, zoning is used to address governmental concerns
based on general welfare, aesthetics, historic preservation, planned
unit communities, flood plains, and open space controls.22 A zoning
regulation separates a municipality into categories of proposed land
use to provide for the orderly developement of cities.23 Zoning
regulations are enacted pursuant to the police power of the state. 24
the fifth amendment. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 257. See infra text accompanying note 107. Inverse
condemnation is a shorthand description used by courts to describe an action brought by a
property owner whose property has not been formally appropriated by an eminent domain
action, but has been damaged or taken de facto by acts of a public entity. A Reply, supra
note 12, at 720-21. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not initiated by the government
cannot deny the fifth amendment right to just compensation. Jacobs v. United States, 290
U.S. 13, 16 (1933). See, e.g., CAL. Cxv. PRoc. CODE § 1245.260 (West Supp. 1981) (providing
for inverse condemnation).
18. The Manifesto, supra note 12, at 219-20. Due to the difficulty in determining when
a taking occurs, government officials may be unaware that a property owner is entitled to just
compensation. Id.
19. See generally San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 638 n.2, (1981) (inverse
condemnation differs from eminent domain in that the landowner, and not the government,
initiates the action; both proceedings, however, allow a landowner to plead a denial of just
compensation).
20. CALnFORNIA CoNmTnMo EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CONDEMNATION PRAC-
TiCE, Zoning § 13.22B, at 224 (1987) [hereinafter CALmIONA CONDEMNATION PRACTICE]. See
ANDERSON, I AMEICAN LAW OF ZONI'NO § 1.02 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter ANDERSON];
RATHKoPF, THE LAW OF ZoNiNo AND PLANNING § 1.02(2) (1987) [hereinafter RATHKOPF];
RoHAN, ZoNiNG AND LANDo USE CONaOs § 1.01[2] [hereinafter ROEAN].
21. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (police power
zoning prohibitions upon the use and enjoyment of the land did not have to satisfy the
requirements of the traditional common law tort of nuisance, but could merely be a proper
use in the wrong place); CALIrORIA CONDEMNATION PRACTICE, supra note 20, § 13.22B, at
224.
22. CALIFORNIA CONDEMNATION PRACTICE, suPRA note 20, § 13.22B, at 224. See ANDERSON,
supra note 20, § 1.12; RATHOPF, supra note 20, sec. 1.01 (1987); RoHAN, supra note 20, §
1.04.
23. CALIFORNIA CONDIEMNATON PRACTICE, supra note 20, § 13.22B, at 223 (examples of
land use categories include residential, commercial, industrial, and open space). See ANDERSON,
supra note 20, § 1.13; RATHKOPF, supra note 20, sec. 1.01; RoHAN, supra note 20, § 1.02[1].
24. See ANDERSON, supra note 20, § 2.02; RATnXOPF, supra note 20, § 1.02(4); ROMAN,
supra note 20, § 2.02[8].
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In analyzing whether a zoning regulation is a taking requiring just
compensation, courts focus on two important questions: 2  is the
regulation of private property so severe that the parameters of the
police power are exceeded so that a taking has occurred; 26 and if a
regulatory taking has occurred, what remedies 'are available to the
aggrieved property owner?27
The United States Supreme Court has not established a precise
formula for determining what governmental acts constitute a taking.28
The Court has asserted that each case must be decided on factual
grounds. 29 The Supreme Court, however, has decided a small number
of regulatory taking cases? 0 The factual and legal contexts of these
decisions are quite diverse. 31 Today, courts generally decide when a
regulation amounts to a taking by applying a variety of tests.3 2 First,
a taking occurs if a regulation fails substantially to advance legitimate
public interests. 33 Second, a taking occurs if a regulation deprives
the landowner of substantially all reasonable use of the land.34 Third,
a taking occurs if a regulation interferes with a reasonable investment-
25. A Reply, supra note 12, at 692. See Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 39 (1985); Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty,
1980 INST. PAN., ZONING & EmmN'N DoMAIN 177 (1980); R. EPsTEIN, TAmNGs: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EmINENT DomArIN (1985); Bley, Use of the Civil Rights Acts to
Recover Damages for Undue Interference with the Use of Land, 1985 INST. ON PLA., ZoNINa
& EmENT DouAIN, ch. 7 (1980); Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 Cmis. L. REv. 569 (1984); Mulligan, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corporation; Another Excursion into the Takings Dilemma, 17 UFB. LAW. 109 (1984).
26. A Reply, supra note 12, at 692. Such action is considered a defacto exercise of the
eminent domain power. See infra notes 28-69.
27. A Reply, supra note 12, at 692. See infra notes 70-121.
28. A Reply, supra note 12, at 693.
29. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2874 (1984); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978). See A Reply, supra note 12, at 693. One commentator notes that the present
state of the law "only provides incentives to litigation, as both sides to this durable controversy
press their causes on the courts in an effort to reduce to precedent the infinitely variable facts
of each dispute." Id.
30. A Reply, supra note 12, at 695 (as a practical matter, no reliable legal doctrines exist
to guide landowners and government in their dealings with novel regulations). See, e.g.,
Kanner, Developments in Eminent Domain: a Candle in the Dark Corner of the Law, 52 J.
URB. L. 861, 885-86 (1975). Cf. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 164-65 (1980).
31. A Reply, supra note 12, at 695.
32. See Mihaly & Shute, Regulation of Land Use After the Recent Supreme Court Cases,
I Q. & A. 2 [hereinafter Regulation of Land Use](August 1987).
33. See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
34. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cai. 3d 266, 276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 31 157 Cal. Rptr.
372, 378, (1979) aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In this test, courts give wide
discretion to cities and counties to make judgments about what regulations are necessary.
Regulation of Land Use, supra note 32, at 2.
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backed expectation. 35 Fourth, a taking occurs when a regulation
results in permanent physical occupation of private property.3 6
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether regu-
lations which have a valid safety purpose may constitute a taking. 37
Under a safety purpose exception, regulations which would be a
taking under either of the four tests articulated above would not be
a taking if enacted for the health, morals, or safety of the public. 38
Another Supreme Court decision, however, states that safety regu-
lations may not be exempt from the taking analysis. 39 This issue is
extremely important in the land use area because zoning regulations
are often enacted to promote the public welfare or safety. 40
In Mugler v. Kansas,41 an alcoholic beverage retailer challenged
the validity of a 1884 Kansas statute which prohibited the sale of
35. Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978). A
landowner is not justified in expecting that the zoning on property will remain constant and
is not protected from changes in zoning laws. Id. at 140. Unfortunately, the courts have
decided more cases defining what does not constitute such expectations. Regulation of Land
Use supra note 32, at 3.
36. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982). See
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (the latest holding by the United
States Supreme Court on when a taking occurs). See also The Manifesto, supra note 12, at
194 n.9 (suggesting that the regulatory taking activities can be grouped into the following six
categories: (1) The physical invasion cases, such as flowage and navigation easements, and
regulations which have the effect of producing a physical invasion; (2) instances in which
government is contemplating acquisition, has said so, and had engaged in other inequitable
conduct designed to depress the acquisition price; (3) cases in which regulation prevents any
reasonable economic use (for example, zoning land for a park or public use, including cases
in which government contemplated acquisition, but abandoned acquistion and substituted
severely restrictive regulation); (4) the designation of land for future acquistion unaccompanied
by inequitable conduct on the part of government; (5) cases in which the regulation has
substantially diminished the value of land; and (6) moratoria cases, which involve a prohibition
of all use for a limited period of time).
37. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Benedictus, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); SHONKWMIER
& MORAN, supra note 10, at 101. Arguments in support of one or another theory of relief in
regulatory taking claims frequently are supported by citations to the Court's earlier decisions.
Id. If the safety exception to takings exists, a court could decide that the most grievous effects
on private property values are justifiable if the public need for the regulation is sufficiently
dire. Callies, Takings Clause-Take Three, A.B.A. J. 54 (Nov. 1, 1987).
38. See Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See SHONKVIMXR & MORAN, supra note 10, at 98.
39. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393; SHQNKWIER & MORAN, supra note 10, at
98. See infra text accompanying notes 55-65.
40. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (police power
zoning prohibitions upon the use and enjoyment of the land did not have to satisfy the
requirements of the traditional common law tort of nuisance, but could merely be a proper
use in the wrong place); CALIOrRNiA CoNDEMNA o N PRAcnTcE, supra note 20, at 224.
41. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, upheld the validity
of a statute prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 668-69.
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alcoholic beverages. 42 The retailer argued that the statute destroyed
his business and was, therefore, a taking which required just com-
pensation .4  The United States Supreme Court disagreed, and held
that the statute was a valid exercise of the police power. 44 The Court
reasoned that the exercise of police power is fundamentally different
from the exercise of eminent domain; valid regulations which prohibit
the use of the land in ways which are injurious to the "health,
morals, or safety" of the community cannot be a taking.45 The Court
reasoned that the regulation did not prevent the owner's use and
control of the land for lawful purposes .46 Instead, the regulation was
merely a declaration by the state that such prohibited use is against
the public interest.47 The Court found, therefore, that valid safety
regulations are reviewed not by the just compensation clause, but by
the due process clause. 48
The Mugler decision has since been cited to support the due process
theory of constitutional taking analysis. 49 Under this analysis, the
power of eminent domain and the police power are discrete and
mutually exclusive.5 The due process clause restrains the State's
exercise of the police power while the just compensation clause
restrains the government's exercise of the power of eminent domain.-1
In applying this analysis, courts first determine if the regulation is
enacted pursuant to the police power or the power of eminent
42. Id. at 649.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 668-69.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Justice Harlan stated:
[s]uch legislation does not disturb the owner of the control or use of his property
for lawful purposes, nor restricts his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration
by the state that its use by anyone, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to
the public interests.
Id.
48. Id. at 668. The Court found, therefore, that valid safety regulations are reviewed by
the due process clause and not the just compensation clause. Id. at 669.
49. SHONKWaLR & MORAN, supra note 10, at 98 (discussing later application of the Mugler
holding). In the early 20th Century, the Mugler decision was followed in upholding prohibitions
of noxious uses. See SHON wER & MORAN, supra note 10, § 2.05(2).1-3. See e.g., Thomas
Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1915). In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), the Supreme Court described
the police power as "one of the most essential powers of government; one that is the least
limitable." Id. at 410.
50. SHOtNKwnrER & MORAN, supra note 10, at 98. See The Manifesto, supra note 12, at
205.
51. SHONICWILER & MoRAN, supra note 10, at 98.
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domain.5 2 If the police power is being utilized, the regulation must
be substantially related' to the public health, morals, welfare, or
safety to be constitutional.53 If the regulation is found to be within
the power of eminent domain, a taking analysis is conducted. 54
The Mugler analysis and the safety regulation exception to takings
were reviewed in the United States Supreme Court decision of Penn-
sylvania Coal Company v. Mahon. 5 In Pennsylvania Coal, the state
enacted a statute forbidding the mining of coal so as to cause
subsidence of a surface structure.5 6 The Pennsylvania Coal Company
challenged the statute as being an unconstitutional taking of the right
to mine coal in a commercially feasible manner.57 The United States
Supreme Court agreed.58 The Court recognized that the statute was
a valid exercise of the State's police power.5 9 Also, an exercise of the
police power may necessarily entail some diminution in property
valueA0 However, the Court found that if the diminution reached a
certain magnitude, a taking will result. 61 The Court held that while
52. Id. at 98-99. One commentator states:
The test most commonly applied by the courts is whether regulation is desigend to
procure a public benefit, in which case it is an exercise of the emminent domain
power, or whether it is designed to prevent the use of property in a manner that is
detrimental or harmful to the public interest, in which case it is an exercise of the
police power.
Id. at 99. This test fails, however, in that nearly all public benefits can be described as the
prevention of public harms. Id.
53. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). The Supreme Court used the due
process clause to invalidate a zoning ordinance that prohibited the plaintiff from using his
property for commercial purposes in a residential zone. Id. This case was decided during the
era of substantive due process review. SHoN~vcwAs & MoRAN, supra note 10, at 104 n.40.
54. Id.
55. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the regulation as a
valid exercise of the police power despite the loss of a commercially feasible way to mine coal
to coal companies. Id. at 412. See SoNKWIu.m & MoR.N, supra note 10, at 103.
56. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 410.
57. Id. at 412.
58. Id. at 414.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 413. The coal company previously alienated the surface rights to the property,
retaining only the mining rights. Id. at 399. The State admitted that the application of the
statute destroyed the economic value of the mining rights of the company. Id.
61. Id. at 413. For a majority of the Court, the issue was whether the police power can
be stretched so far as to require just compensation. Id. The inquiry of the Court was not
confined to the issue of physical appropriation, but extended to the effect of the regulation
on the economic use of the property. "While property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415. In interpreting this
language, one court found that "taking" was only used metaphorically, and not in the context
of the fifth amendment. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587,
594, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 (1976) (arguing that Pennsylvania Coal was
decided under the due process clause and not the just compensation clause). Cf. A Reply,
supra note 10, at 726 n.185 (arguing that the analysis in Fred F. French of Pennsylvania Coal
is clearly erroneous).
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property may be regulated to a certain extent, valid safety regulations
which "go too far" will be compensable takings.62 The statute which
promoted a valid safety purpose was a taking when the regulation
prevented the economic use of the property. 63 For constitutional
purposes, to make it commercially impractical to mine coal has the
same effect as the government taking, appropriating, or destroying
the property.6 The Court held that the statute could not be consti-
tutional if there was no compensation to the Company for the
property rights taken .6
Pennsylvania Coal has since been applied to support the just
compensation theory of constitutional takings analysis.66 Under this
theory, both the power of eminent domain and the police power are
part of a continuum of governmental authority permitting the state
to act in furtherance of legitimate goals. 67 Even valid safety regula-
tions which reach a certain magnitude will be compensable takings
under this analysis.68 However, the United States Supreme Court has
failed to more clearly define the extent of any safety regulation
exception to the taking analysis.69
62. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414. The opinion concluded that the statute could
not be sustained as a valid police power exercise even though a valid public purpose existed.
When the regulation worked to prevent economic use of the property, the regulation could
only be sustained if the state compensated the landowner. Id. Compare The Manifesto, supra
note 12, at 208-14 (arguing that Justice Holmes did not use takings in the just compensation
context); with A Reply, supra note 12, at 713, 725-28 (arguing that Justice Holmes used the
term taking in the just compensation context) and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1357 (1987) (distinguishing and upholding a regulation factually
similar to the regulation invalidated in Pennsylvania Coal).
63. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
64. Id. ("What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with
profit. To make it commercially impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly the same
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.").
65. Id. at 416. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1357
(1987).
66. SHON wIER & MoRAN, supra note 10, at 98.
67. Id. See A Reply, supra note 5, at 687. See also L. TRINE, AismucAN CONSnTrToNAL
LAW 460 (1978) (explaining that there is in fact no practical difference between physically
seizing property and preventing the use of that property:
Thus a clear case is one that intuitively seems like a taking in the layman's sense of
that term: a physical takeover of a distinct entity, with an accompanying transfer
of the legal powers of enjoyment and exclusion that are typically associated with
rights of property. Moreover, forcing someone to stop doing something with his
property-telling him "you can keep it, but you can't use it"-is indistinguishable,
in ordinary terms, from grabbing it and handing it over to someone else. Thus, a
"taking" occurs in this ordinary sense when government controls a person's use of
property so tightly that, although some uses remain to the owner, the property's
value has been virtually destroyed .... ).
68. A Reply, supra note 12, at 677. This theory would hold that a taking "is a taking,
is a taking." Id.
69. SHO KWxvMR & MORAN, supra note 10, at 98.
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There are three possible remedies available to deprived landowners
following a regulatory taking.70 First, when a regulatory taking oc-
curs, the landowner may recover monetary damages as just compen-
sation for the taking.7' Next, the landowner may seek declaratory
action.72 The constitutional prohibition against uncompensated tak-
ings is satisfied when the offending regulation is declared invalid. 73
Finally, the landowner may seek just compensation and invalidation. 74
C. Judicial History
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,75 the landowner, whose property was
zoned to limit development to one house per acre on a five acre
parcel, was denied an action in inverse condemnation. 76 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that judicial invalidation of the governmental
regulation served as an adequate remedy for a regulatory taking.77
The court held that, aside from an action declaring the regulation
constitutionally invalid, a landowner could not bring an inverse
condemnation action for a governmental zoning regulation. 78 The
California Supreme Court in Agins reasoned that a zoning regulation
is a legitimate exercise of state police power. 79 In applying the due
process theory,80 the court held the proper remedy for a regulatory
taking is limited to either declaratory relief or administrative man-
damus. 81 Under either of these remedies, the constitutional validity
of the legislation is reviewed. 82
70. See A Reply, supra note 12, at 695.
71. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651-52 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 95-110.
72. A Reply, supra note 12, at 695. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276-
67, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255
(1980). See The Manifesto, supra note 12, at 194 (neither the Constitution, constitutional
jurisprudence, nor any decision of the United States Supreme Court commands or justifies
the payment of compensation when a land use regulation is declared invalid).
73. A Reply, supra note 12, at 695.
74. Id. Legal authority is available to support virtually any of these solutions. Id. See,
e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 227 U.S. 183 (1928);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Benedictus, 107 S. Ct. 1234 (1987).
75. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447
U.S. 255 (1980).
76. Id. at 271, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
77. Id. at 278, 598 P.2d at 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
78. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
79. Id. at 274, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (stating that Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) is erroneously cited as authority that regulations may constitute
a compensable taking).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
81. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 275, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (following Euclid v.
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The Agins court stated that just compensation is required only
during the period in which the government enforces the regulation
following a judicial finding that the regulation resulted in a taking.83
The court reasoned that allowing damages for regulatory takings
creates a chilling effect upon the exercise of the state's police powers
due to the constant threat of litigation.84 The cost of litigation, and
possible just compensation liability, financially inhibits the govern-
ment from enacting future legislation necessary for proper land use
management.". The California Supreme Court in Agins further held
that a government regulation is unconstitutional if the effect is to
deprive the landowner of substantially all reasonable use of the
landowner's property.8 6 Since this regulation did not deprive the
landowner of substantially all reasonable use of his land, the court
did not declare the regulation invalid. 7 The United States Supreme
Court granted review."8
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 9 the United States Supreme Court
did not determine whether the remedies granted by the California
Supreme Court in Agins violated the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution."' The Supreme Court instead found that zoning
which limited development to one house per acre on a five acre
parcel did not amount to a taking.91 Although development was
limited, the regulation neither prevented the best use of the land,
extinguished a fundamental attribute of ownership, nor denied pursuit
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). Administrative mandamus is a declaratory remedy
whereby the only issue litigated is the constitutionality of the regulation; damages are not
awarded in an administrative mandamus action. Id.
82. See SHONKWILER & MoRAN, supra note 10, at 111.
83. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
84. Id. at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377. The need for preserving a degree
of freedom in land-use planning, and the need to inhibit the financial force which inheres in
the inverse condemnation remedy suggests that invalidation, and not compensation, is the
proper relief for a regulatory taking. Id. at 276-77, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
85. Id. at 276-77, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378. Another commentator stated:
"this threat of unanticipated financial liability will intimidate legislative bodies and will
discourage the implementation of strict or innovative planning measures in favor of measures
which are less stringent, more traditional, and fiscally safe."
Hall, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law? 28
HAsn ias L.J. 1569, 1597 (1977) (cited by the Agins court, 24 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 598 P.2d at
31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378).
86. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The court also
accepted the general proposition that whether a regulation is excessive in any particular
situation involves question of degree, turning on the individual facts of each case. Id.
87. Id.
88. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 444 U.S. 1101 (1980).
89. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
90. Agins, 447 U.S. at 263.
91. Id.
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of reasonable investment-backed expectations. 92 Because there was no
taking, the Court did not need to reach the issue of remedies.9 a The
Court left unanswered the question of whether a state may limit the
remedies available to landowners deprived of property rights to
declaratory relief and adminstrative mandamus.9 4
In the subsequent case of San Diego Gas and Electric v. City of
San Diego,95 the California Court of Appeals held that an owner of
property which has been down-zoned from industrial to open space
was not allowed to pursue a taking claim. 96 Instead, the plaintiff
could only pursue declaratory relief or administrative mandamus. 97
The California Supreme Court denied review, but the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 98 A majority of the Court held that
because the California courts did not reach a final decision as to
whether a taking had occurred, the Court lacked jurisdiction to
decide the proper remedy for regulatory takings. 99 In the five to four
opinion, Justice Rehnquist concurred with the majority that the Court
lacked jurisdiction because there was not a final determination of
the taking issue. 100 Justice Rehnquist, however, joined the dissenting
justices in finding that just compensation, rather than invalidation,
was the constitutionally required remedy for regulatory takings. 0' In
theory, therefore, five justices apparently supported Justice Brennan's
opinion that an inverse condemnation remedy is appropriate for
regulatory takings.e 2
In his dissent in San Deigo Gas and Electric Co., Justice Brennan
found that the California courts had reached a final judgment
regarding the taking issue.0 3 The final judgment existed since Cali-
fornia courts would never allow a taking claim prior to the invali-
92. Id. at 262.
93. Id. at 263 (because no taking has occurred, the Court did not consider whether a
state may limit the remedies available to a person whose land had been taken without just
compensation).
94. Id.
95. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
96. Id. at 629-30. The company bought land for a future power plant, and the city down-
zoned the property to open space. San Diego Gas and Electric brought an inverse condemnation
action claiming the city had taken its land arguing that just compensation must be paid under
the fifth amendment. The California Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Id.
97. Id. at 628.
98. Id. at 630.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 633 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
102. The Manifesto, supra note 12, at 196.
103. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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dation of the regulation. 1°4 Thus, the Court was entitled to assume
a taking existed to review the remedy issue.'e0 Justice Brennan also
found that the state's exercise of police power may effectuate takings
under the just compensation clause. 106 Because of the self-executing
character of the fifth amendment with respect to compensation,
Justice Brennan found invalidation without compensation would be
an improper remedy.107 Contrary to the holding of the California
courts in Agins, the fifth amendment requires just compensation be
paid to the San Diego Gas & Electric Company for the period of
the taking.10 8 According to Justice Brennan, once a police power
regulation has effected a taking, the government entity must pay just
compensation for this taking.'1 9 Under Justice Brennan's view, the
government must pay just compensation for the period during which
the regulation effectuated a taking.1'0
Following San Diego Gas and Electric, commentators and courts
disagreed as to the proper remedy for regulatory takings."' While
California courts continued to apply the established law of Agins,12
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted Justice Brennan's dissent
in San Diego Gas and Electric."3 In the only two subsequent regu-
104. Id. at 647.
105. Id. at 648.
106. Id. (recognizing that United States Supreme Court precedent clearly allows takings to
occur where the government is exercising police powers).
107. Id. at 654. Self-executing constitutional provisions are constitutional provisions which
are immediately effective without the necessity of ancillary legislation. BLAcK's LAW DIcnoNARY
1220 (5th ed. 1979). A self-executing provision supplies sufficient rule by which a right given
may be enjoyed, or a duty imposed may be enforced. Id. A provision is not self-executing
when principles are merely stated without providing rules to give the rules the force of law.
Id. In Justice Brennan's opinion, the fifth amendment is self-executing, and therefore
compensation must be awarded for any taking, including takings by formal eminent domain
proceedings, occupancy, physical invasion or regulation. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at
654 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since the fifth amendment is self-executing, property owners
have a constitutional right to bring an inverse condemnation action for just compensation
whenever a taking occurs. Id. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1979); 6 P.
NICHOLs, EMMENT DoirN § 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972).
108. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 658.
109. Id.
110. Id.
I11. The Manifesto, supra note 12, at 196 (arguing that the dissent in San Diego Gas &
Elec. improperly states takings law); A Reply, supra note 12, at 687 (arguing that the dissent
in San Diego Gas & Elec. correctly states the Supreme Court's views on takings law). See
infra text accompanying notes 112-13.
112. See Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 138 Cal. App. 3d 484, 621 P.2d
197, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191. See also The Manifesto, supra note 12, at 194 (noting that too much
authority is being placed on a dissenting opinion which now is only supported by three members
of the present Court).
113. See Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983); In re Air Crash in Bali, 684 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982).
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latory taking cases heard by the United States Supreme Court, again
the Court did not discuss the remedy issue because the lower courts
had not determined whether a taking had actually occurred.' 1 4
Commentators agreeing with the California Supreme Court decision
in Agins argue that compensation for regulatory takings should never
be available." 5 The government would be afforded greater latitude
in enacting zoning regulations if just compensation is not required
for regulatory takings.'1 6 The government will not have to refrain from
adopting and executing regulations necessary to properly plan and
direct municipal growth because of the potential for high cost in
litigating the constitutionality of a regulation and in compensating
property owners for regulatory takings.' "
Other commentators favor the just compensation requirement for
regulatory takings as proposed by the dissent in San Diego Gas and
Electric.118 Just compensation liability would penalize unconstitutional
decision-making in land use planning." 9 Municipalities would be
encouraged to enact regulations which would not deprive property
owners of constitutional protections. 20 Finally, private property own-
ers would not be forced to bear the financial burden resulting from
an inability to use their property during the period the regulation
See also A Reply, supra note 12, at 686 (listing jurisdictions which have adopted Justice
Brennan's analysis in San Diego Gas & Elec.). As of 1986, Justice Brennan's dissent in San
Diego Gas & Elec. was adopted by six federal courts of appeals. Id.
114. See MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (The
United States Supreme Court held the remedy issue for regulatory takings was not ripe for
review.); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985). Title 28 of the United States Code section 1257 states: "Final judgments or decrees
rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980).
115. The Manifesto, supra note 12, at 240; A Reply, supra note 12, at 686, 688.
116. Id.
117. A Reply, supra note 12, at 737; The Manifesto, supra note 12, at 240.
118. See A Reply, supra note 12, at 684.
119. See San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 662 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One
commentator states:
Under California's system, government agencies know they have nothing to lose by
issuing use-stultifying regulations. Under no circumstances will California courts do
more than order the offender to stop. And even that minimal relief is rarely
forthcoming. Indeed, one searches the reports of California Supreme Court cases in
vain for any recent decision which invalidates a confiscatory zoning ordinance....
[t]he last such case, Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 335 (1963), was decided more than two decades ago.
A Reply, supra note 12, at 741 n.254.
120. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 662 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In 1957, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
(The Church) purchased "Lutherglen," a 21-acre parcel of land in
a river canyon in the Angeles National Forest.122 The Church operated
the site as a retreat center and a recreational area for handicapped
children. 12 In February of 1978, a creek adjoining the property
flooded, destroying the Lutherglen buildings and killing ten people.124
In response to the dangerous condition of the canyon, the County
of Los Angeles adopted an interim ordinance in January, 1979, which
prohibited the rebuilding of any structures at Lutherglen.1 21 The
Church filed a complaint for damages in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court alleging that the interim ordinance denied the Church
of all reasonable use of the Lutherglen Property. 126 The superior
121. Id. at 656 n.22. Justice Brennan quoted the advice of a prominent California city
attorney to his colleagues as follows:
If all Else fails, merely amend the regulation and start over again.
If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive a claim attacking
the land use regulation, or if you try the case and lose, don't worry about it. All
is not lost. One of the extra "goodies" contained in the recent [California] Supreme
Court case of Selby v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, appears to allow
the city to change the regulation in question, even after trial and judgment, make
it more reasonable, more restrictive, or whatever, and everybody starts over again.
See how easy it is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you can lose the battle and
still win the war.
Good Luck.
Id. (emphasis in the original)(citing Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional Attacks
on Land Use Regulation (including inverse condemnation), 38 Nno. L. Rnv. 192-93 (1975)).
Property owners may suffer severe harm during the invalidation process, including: foreclosure,
the property owner may die during the interim, developing expenses may become too excessive,
and real estate taxes continue to be demanded. A Reply, supra note 12, at 744-45.
122. First English Evangelical Luthern Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2381 (1987).
123. Id. at 2381.
124. Id.
125. Id. CouTy OF Los ANGELES INTERBI ORDNA1cE No. 11,855 states in pertinent part:
"[a] person shall not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure, any
portion of which is, or will be located within the outer boundary lines of the interim flood
protection area located in Mill Creek Canyon. . . ." Id. at 2381-82.
126. Id. at 2382. The complaint contained two claims. First, the Church alleged that
defendants were liable to the Church for creating a dangerous condition upstream from the
properties and that the ordinance denied the Church all use of their property. The second
claim sought recovery in inverse condemnation because of cloudseeding undertaken by the
County. Id.
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court rejected the claim and ruled that monetary damage is not the
proper remedy for a taking which results from the interim ordinance,
relying on the California rule in Agins v. City of Tiburon.2 7
The California court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
Superior Court.'2 Relying on Agins, the appellate court held that
the Church could not bring an action in inverse condemnation to
obtain monetary relief since the alleged taking resulted from govern-
mental regulation. 29 Without deciding whether a taking existed, the
appellate court ruled that a determination of whether a taking oc-
curred was premature since there had been no judicial finding that
the regulation was invalid. 30 The California Supreme Court denied
review.' The Church petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for review to determine if the California courts had unconstitutionally
denied an inverse condemnation remedy pursuant to the rule in Agins
v. City of Tiburon.32
B. The Opinion
Without deciding whether a taking occurred in the facts of First
English, the Court reached the remedy issue and enumerated three
127. Id. The Superior Court of Los Angeles granted defendants motion to strike the portions
of the complaint alleging that the county ordinance denied all use of Lutherglen because of
the California Supreme Court decision of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d
25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Id. The trial
court also granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the second cause of
action based on cloudseeding. The Court rejected plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim and
at the close of plaintiffs' evidence at trial, granted a nonsuit on behalf of defendants, dismissing
the entire conplaint. Id. at 2383 n.2. The portions of the Church complaint rejected by the
trial court stated:
216
On January 11, 1979, the County adopted Ordinance No. 11,855, which provides:
Section 1. A person shall not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building
or structure, any portion of which is, or will be located within the outer boundary
lines of the interim flood protection located in the Mill Creek Canyon vicinity of
Hidden Springs, on Map No. 63 ML 52, attached hereto as though fully set forth."
217
Lutherglen is within the flood protection area created by Ordinance No. 11,855.
218
Ordinance No. 11,855 denies First Church all use of Lutherglen.
Id. at 2390 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The California Code of Civil Procedure allows the court
to "strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading." CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE § 436 (vest Supp. 1987).
128. First English, 106 S. Ct. at 2383.
129. Id. 'at 2383 (stating that the appellate court felt obligated to follow Agins because the
United States Supreme Court had "not yet ruled on whether a state may constitutionally limit
the remedy for a taking to nonmonetary relief." Id.
130. Id. (according to Agins, a taking occurs only if the government chooses to enforce a
regulation that has been declared invalid due to the excesssive use of police powers by the
state).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2833. In Agins, the California Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment
does not require compensation as a remedy for temporary regulatory takings. Id.
946
1988 / Recent Developments
new rules to guide states in land use planning. 33 First, valid state
regulation of property requires payment of just compensation if the
regulation results in a taking of private property. 134 The Court noted
that the just compensation clause does not prohibit the taking of
private property; rather, the clause mandates the payment of just
compensation to the deprived landowner as a condition to the exercise
of governmental power. 3 The Court stated that the fifth amendment
is not designed to limit governmental interference with property
rights, but instead secures compensation in the event otherwise proper
interference amounts to a taking. 36 In analyzing the proper remedy,
the Supreme Court in First English assumed that a temporary building
moratorium 137 constituted a taking. 38 Although the moratorium was
a valid exercise of governmental power, the Church would be entitled
to just compensation if on remand the trial court determined that
the regulation denied all reasonable use of the property."1
9
Second, the Court held that the just compensation clause is self-
executing."4' The right to recover just compensation is not limited to
133. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Powell, and Scalia. Id. The Court noted that jurisdiction properly existed under
title 28 of the United States Code section 1257 because the trial court assumed a taking existed
in striking the Church allegations pursuant to Agins.. Id. at 2384. While prior concerns
regarding ripeness prevented earlier review of the remedy issue, those concerns were not present
in First English. Id. at 2384. The remedy issue was not reviewed earlier because factual disputes
existed as to whether a taking had occurred. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980). Nor was the remedy issue ripe when factual disputes might lead to the conclusion that
a taking had not occurred. See MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct.
2561 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). First
English, however, properly presented the remedy issue because the California courts denied
inverse condemnation without challenging whether the facts of First English were insufficient
to constitute a taking or would not constitute a taking under the safety regulation exception
to takings. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384. Since the remedy issue was presented without
factual dispute as to whether a taking occurred, the Court held the case ripe for review. Id.
at 2384. See CAIFomRIA STATE UNIVERSITY REAL ESTATE AND LAND USE INSTITUTE, THE
WORLD AFTER RECENT U.S. SUPRE ME COURT DECISIONS: LAND USE, PRIVATE PROPERTY,
PuBLic RIGHTS, CONFERENCE HANDBOOK, 18 (Nov. 21, 1987) [hereinafter CONFERENCE] (dis-
cussing the three new land use rules promulgated in First English) (copy on file at the Pacific
Law Journal).
134. First English, 106 S. Ct. at 2386.
135. Id. at 2385.
136. Id. at 2385-86. Governmental action that effects a taking of private property necessarily
implicates the constitutional obligation to pay just compensation. Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
137. A moratorium is a land use regulation whereby changes of the property are prohibited
for a specified period. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 910 (5th ed. 1979).
138. First English, 106 S. Ct. at 2389.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2386. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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situations in which the government institutes condemnation proceed-
ings, enacts statutory compensation remedies, or directly promises to
provide the property owner with just compensation. 41 Instead, the
right to just compensation is required by the Constitution whenever
a taking occurs. 4 2 This constitutional right is protected by allowing
inverse condemnation actions when the government has not taken
the property by eminent domain. 43 Because of the self-executing
nature of the fifth amendment, the Court held that the California
rule, articulated in Agins, unconstitutionally denied the Church an
inverse condemnation remedy.' 44 Thus, the Supreme Court in First
English implicitly overruled the California Court's decision in Agins
v. City of Tiburon.145
Finally, the First English Court held that the constitutional re-
quirement of compensation for permanent takings also applies to
temporary regulatory takings. 46 The Court defined temporary regu-
latory takings as takings that occur prior to a judicial determination
that a statute is invalid. 47 The Court first recognized that just
compensation has always been required for temporary physical tak-
ings. 48 Both temporary regulatory takings and temporary physical
takings may be stopped by later governmental action. 49 Since the
government must compensate the property owner for the time the
temporary physical taking is in effect, the government must also
compensate for temporary regulatory takings. 50 In addition, tempo-
141. First English, 106 S. Ct. at 2386.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2386-87.
144. Id. at 2387. In Agins, the California Supreme Court denied inverse condemnation
actions prior to the invalidation of the challanged regulation. Id.
145. Id. See The Limits of Land Use Regulation: Hearing on the Effects of U.S. Supreme
Court's First Lutheran and Nollan Decisions on California's Local Goverments Before the
Senate Comm. on Local Government, 13 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing] (copy on file at the
Pacific Law Journal); COtFRENCE, supra note 133, at 18.
146. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389 (stating "We merely hold that where the government's
activities have already worked a taking of all use of the property, no subsequent action by
the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period which the
taking was effective.").
147. Id. at 2388-89.
148. Id. at 2387. See United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958) (compensating the property
owner after the United States had entered into physical possession and began laying pipe
through the tract); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (owner of a laundry
plant compensated after the United States Army had taken possession of the facilities for the
duration of World War II); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946) (owner
compensated for lease acquired by condemnation by the United States); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 65 (1945) (owner compensated for the government acquired
portion of a leased building).
149. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2387.
150. Id. at 2388.
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rary takings which deny all reasonable use of the property are not
distinguishable from permanent takings for the period in which the
taking occurs.' Prior to First English, most courts agreed that
permanent takings require just compensation. 5 2 The California su-
perior court in First English assumed that the temporary moratorium
denied the Church all reasonable use of the property for three years.5 3
Since just compensation has been paid for physical takings of shorter
periods, the Court held that just compensation is the constitutionally
required remedy for the temporary regulatory taking in First Eng-
lish.54 The Supreme Court remanded the issue of whether a taking
had actually occurred to the trial court. 155
C. The Dissent
In the dissent, Justice Stevens found four flaws in the analysis of
the majority. 156 First, the taking issue was not ripe for review because
the issue of whether a taking existed had never been decided by the
trial court. 57 Second, temporary regulatory takings require different
treatment under the just compensation clause than permanent tak-
ings.15 8 Third, the majority incorrectly assumed that California would




154. Id. at 2388-89 (stating: "We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of course
do not deal with the quite different questions in the case of normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, and the like which are not before us.").
155. Id. at 2381. The Court reversed the judgment of the California Court of Appeals,
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id. Because of the
final decision of the California courts, the United States Supreme Court did not independently
decide if the facts constituted a taking. Id. at 2384-85 n.7. The Supreme Court did not
determine the effects of the later enacted permanent ordinance upon plaintiffs' use of their
property. Id. The Court held they were not obligated to review the permanent ordinance
because it was not mentioned in the complaint or in the the decisions of the California courts.
Id. The County of Los Angeles adopted the successor to the interim ordinance in 1981, which
stated:
a person shall not use, erect, construct, move onto, or alter, modify, enlarge or
reconstruct any building or structure within the jurisdiction of a flood protection
district except... accessory building and structure that will not substanitally impede
the flow of water, including sewer, gas, electrical, and water systems, approved by
the county engineer ... automobile parking facilities incidental to a lawfully estab-
lished use ... and flood control structures approved by the chief engineer for the
Los Angeles County Flood Control District.
First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2392 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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nally, the due process clause, and not the just compensation clause,
limits land use regulations. 16
Justice Stevens concluded that the county ordinance was a valid
health and safety regulation designed to protect against flooding and
damage during an interim study. 1'6 The building moratorium created
an interim period to determine whether future building at Lutherglen
would be safe.162 Since the ordinance was a valid exercise of the
state's police power to provide for public health and safety, the
dissent found that the facts of First English failed to present a taking
which requires monetary compensation. 13
Justice Stevens criticizes the majority's argument that monetary
damages should be awarded for any land use regulation which denies
all reasonable use of property.164 According to Justice Stevens, the
due process clause, and not the just compensation clause, protects
the property owner from improperly motivated, unfairly conducted,
or unnecessarily protracted governmental decision making.' 61 Finally,
Justice Stevens predicted that the decision in First English will have
a chilling effect upon the good faith planning efforts of local zoning
officials by encouraging a "litigation explosion" in which property
owners will seek damages for alleged regulatory takings. 166
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The United States Supreme Court in First English held that where
governmental activity has worked a taking of property, no subsequent
160. Id. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined the dissent in finding that the taking was
not ripe for review, and that the majority incorrectly analyzed California law. Id. at 2389.
See supra text accompanying notes 157 and 159.
161. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2392.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2392-93.
164. Id. at 2393. Justice Stevens argues that regulatory takings differ from physical
invasions. Id. Physical takings are easily identifiable and rarely occur. Id. Virtually all physical
invasions are deemed a taking. Id. Regulatory takings often require economic analysis to
identify. Id. Regulatory takings are also not deemed compensable unless the adverse effects
upon the property also destroy a major portion of the value of the property. Id. Justice
Stevens argues that land planners need not be held to the same knowledge of the Constitution
as policemen are required. Id. at 2399 n.17. The United States Supreme Court, he argues,
recognizes that objective rules to assess when a regulation becomes a taking cannot be
established. Property owners, and not the government should bear this burden. Id.
165. Id. at 2399.
166. Id. at 2399-400. Arguments of "chilling" future activity have been discredited in the
past. See A Reply, supra note 12, at 749 n.292; Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343,
366, 144 P.2d 818, 832 (1943) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting from the court's holding
that compensating property owners would prevent construction of more freeways; California
at the time had only one eight mile freeway).
1988 / Recent Developments
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking occurred. 67 The
Court defined two new rules in land use regulation. 6 Temporary
regulations may constitute compensable takings, 169 and in any period
in which a taking occurs, the government will be liable to the property
owner for just compensation. 70
The United States Supreme Court has implicitly overruled the
California Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon.17 '
Consequently, a property owner will not have to wait until a regu-
lation is invalidated to bring an inverse condemnation action. 72
Further, a landowner must be compensated for the period prior to
a judicial determination that the regulation is invalid.'73 The fifth
amendment is self-executing and therefore the right to bring an action
in inverse condemnation is granted by the Constitution and not from
legislative enactments. 174 Limitations upon inverse condemnation are
unconstitutional limits upon the fifth amendment. 175 Since landowners
may now be compensated for the period prior to a judicial deter-
mination that a regulation is invalid, the Supreme Court in First
English has shifted the loss of use for regulatory takings from private
property owners to government. 76 This shift may chili the enactment
167. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389. This decision overrules the California Supreme
Court decision of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 311, 57
Cal. Rptr. 372, 378, (1979). aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Early commentators
differed greatly upon the effects the First English decision. Compare L.A. Times, June 11,
1987, Part II, at 4 (stating that the decision if First English has cast an "instant pall on state
and local land use controls"); with Hearing, supra note 145, at 139 (stating the decision will
not affect reasonable land use regulations). Interestingly, one commentator notes that the
majority is made up of both liberals and conservatives. Gauman, A True Landmark Decision,
LAND USE L. 3 (1987). This factor is not very important because such labels have been
insignificant in predicting land use decisions. Id. In the majority opinion, however, Chief
Justice Rehnquist has made much of Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec., the
current law in regulatory takings. Id. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621, 634-35 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384. See CONFERENCE, supra note 145, at 17.
169. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384. See CONFERENCE, supra note 145, at 17.
170. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389. See CONFERENCE, supra note 145, at 17.
171. Hearing, supra note 145, at 13; CONFERENCE, supra note 145, at 18.
172. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372, 378 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See Hearing, supra note 145, at
13.
173. Hearing, supra note 145, at 4 (stating that "since not many regulations are found
unconstitutional, the practical impact of First English is likely to be" slight (emphasis in the
original)); See also id. at 13 (stating "if a planning practice was wrong before First English,
it is still wrong but now the clock [compensation claims] is ticking.").
174. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386. See supra text accompanying note 107.
175. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386.
176. Hearing, supra note 145, at 4.
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of future governmental land use regulations as planners may fear
that a court will later find that a taking has occurred and require
just compensation be paid to a landowner. 177 Furthermore, property
owners may attack a greater number of land use regulations as
uncompensated takings in hopes of receiving just compensation as
provided by the fifth amendment. 178
The Court did not describe a method by which to calculate just
compensation awards. 79 The First English Court cites United States
v. Causby'80 which held that the loss to the landowner, not the gain
to the government must be used to measure damages.' 8 ' Damages,
however, might be calculated according to traditional practices in
eminent domain proceedings. 8 2 For example, interim damages in
inverse condemnation proceedings are often determined by using the
fair rental value of the property interest taken for the period the
taking occurred.'83 Finally, by choosing to seek damages instead of
attempting to have a regulation invalidated, a property owner could
be viewed as failing to avoid or mitigate damages, thereby precluding
a full recovery. 184
The Court in First English never decided the taking issue.'85 In
holding that temporary regulatory takings require just compensation,
the Court merely assumed that a taking existed rather than separately
deciding if a taking occurred. 86 The Court's approach, however, is
consistent with prior cases where the remedy issue was not reached
because the Court held the taking issue was not ripe for review. 87
177. Hearing, supra note 145, at 13; CONFERENCE, supra note 145, at 18.
178. Hearing, supra note 145, at 13; CONFERENCE, supra note 145, at 18.
179. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85; Hearing, supra note 145, at 13; CONFERENCE,
supra note 145, at 18.
180. 238 U.S. 256 (1947).
181. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388 (citing Causby, 238 U.S. at 261). See San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 659 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
"the value of the property taken may be ascertained as of the date of the taking").
182. Hearing, supra note 145, at 179.
183. Id.
184. Hearing, supra note 145, at 5. At common law, there is a requirement that injured
parties mitigate their damages. See Albers v. Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 397 P.2d 129, 42
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965). The court holds that a condemnee has a duty to take all reasonable
measures to minimize losses, and is entitled to recover for expenses incurred in a good faith
attempt to mitigate damages. Id. Failure to mitigate will preclude recovery for any losses which
the injured party could have avoided through reasonable action. Id.
185. Hearing, supra note 145, at 13; CONFERENCE, supra note 145, at 18; Callies, Takings
Clause-Take Three, A.B.A. J. 53 (Nov. 1, 1987).
186. First Engish, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
187. In prior decisions, the Court refused to assume that a taking had occurred to reach
the remedy issue. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986);
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In First English, the remedy issue is ripe for review because the trial
court denied the inverse condemnation remedy as a matter of law
prior to a judicial determination that the regulation was invalid.188
Since a taking was assumed in First English, it is unclear whether a
regulatory taking exists under the facts of the case. 189 The Court also
did not decide whether delays in obtaining permits, changes in zoning
ordinances, and variances results in a temporary taking.' 9° Case by
case determinations of these and other temporary situations will need
to be decided in the future.19'
By remanding the taking issue, the lower court will also have to
decide if the County is insulated from just compensation under the
safety regulation exception to takings as stated in Mugler v. Kansas.92
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not decided whether
safety regulations are absolutely immune from a taking analysis, or
whether at some point, safety regulations "go too far" as stated in
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, becoming compensable. 93 Most com-
mentators believe that the building moratorium in First English is a
valid exercise of the state's police power to enact safety regulations.194
By finding the remedy issue not ripe for review, and by not utilizing
the safety regulation exception to find otherwise, the Court may be
implying that safety regulations can result in compensable takings. 195
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980); SHONKWELER & MORAN, LAND USE LITIGATION, supra note 10, at 98. The
Court, however, found the facts in First English ripe for review because inverse condemnation
was denied by the California court as a matter of law without factual dispute as to whether
a taking had occurred. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384. In addition, because the California
courts did not review the facts in denying the inverse condemnation remedy, the Court was
not bound to individually review the facts of First English to determine whether a taking
occurred to reach the remedy issue. Id.; See supra text accompanying note 133. Generally,
however, the United States Supreme Court reviews the individual facts of a case to decide if
a taking has occurred. See A Reply, supra note 12, at 693, 695.
188. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384.
189. Id. at 2384. The Court stated that "We accordingly have no occasion to decide
whether the ordinance at issue actually denied appellant all use of its property ... ." Id.
190. Id. at 2389 (opinion did not decide if compensation is required for normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances and other similar govern-
mental activity).
191. Id.; CONFERENCE, supra note 145, at 17 (shorter deprivations of use will probably be
analyzed on their own facts, including the impact of the regulation on the property owner).
192. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85. See CoNFERENcE, suRA note 145, at 17; Callies,
Takings Clause-Take Three, A.B.A. J. 53 (Nov. 1, 1987).
193. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); SHONKWER & MORAN,
supra note 10, at 98.
194. Hearings, supra note 145, at 140; CONFER.NCE, supra note 145, at 18.
195. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2383 (finding that concerns with finality as to whether a
taking occurred prevented earlier review of the proper remedy for regulatory takings).
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The Court, however, did not expressly reach this conclusion.196
Upon enactment of the regulation, a just compensation remedy
may be available to a private property owner. The Court, however,
indicated that a taking does not necessarily occur upon such an
enactment. 197 Therefore, damages may arise from the date when the
196. Id. at 2384-85; Hearing, supra note 145, at 5. The Court stated that they were not
deciding "whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had
occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's
authority to enact safety regulations." First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85. See Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). In Keystone, the Court recently distinguished and upheld
a statute facially similar to the statute invalidated in Pennsylvania Coal. Keystone, 107 S. Ct.
at 1244-47. The Court in Keystone held that due process clause as stated in Mugler v. Kansas
123 U.S. 623 (1887) was controlling, and not the just compensation clause. Keystone, 107 S.
Ct. at 1245. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48. This holding would signal that the
safety regulations are absolutely immune from being a taking. First English, however, may
indicate that, contrary to Mugler, safety regulations can be a taking. First, Pennsylvania Coal,
which appeared to be weakened after the Keystone decision, is cited by the Court as the
"established doctrine" for finding that temporary regulatory takings require just compensation.
First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386; See supra text accompanying notes 56-69 (Pennsylvania Coal
held that safety regulations which go too far may be a taking, and is the foundation of the
just compensation theory of consitututional takings analysis, which would apply a taking
analysis to all governmental activity without exception). In addition, the Court, in prior
decisions, placed significance on whether a taking had occurred for jurisdictional reasons
before deciding the remedy issue. See MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S.
Ct. 2561 (1986) (remedy issue held not ripe for review because variances were not submitted
to planning authorities after denial of an original plan); Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (remedy issue held not ripe for review because
the landowner did not test planning restrictions); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (remedy issue not ripe for review because lack of a final decision
as to whether a taking occurred); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (remedy issue
not ripe because the regulation limiting development of a five acre parcel to one house per
acre was held not to constitute sufficient deprivation of use to be a taking). The Court in
First English, however, reaches the remedy issue for regulatory takings by assuming a taking
has occurred by a regulation which clearly qualifies for the safety exception. First English,
107 S. Ct. at 2383 (the three year building moratorium was enacted to study conditions on
property which was flooded one year earlier, destroying all the buildings and killing ten
persons); See supra text accompanying notes 122-25; Hearing, supra note 145, at 17 (noting
that the Court assumed a taking existed in the First English decision, even where prior law
indicated that the safety exception insulated government from a taking analysis). The Court's
assumption in First English may be rationalized in one of three ways. (1) The Court, having
waited to determine the results of the California rule in Agins, was now ready to hold Agins
unconstitutional. (2) The Court did not use the safety exception because the County did not
raise this issue at the trial level in the motion to strike. See First English, S. Ct. at 2382. (3)
First English is an example of a safety regulation which goes too far and is, therefore, a
taking under the Pennsylvania Coal analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 56-69. Cf.
First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority interject
the safety exception to hold the remedy issue not ripe for review). What the Court may be
suggesting is that Pennsylvania Coal remains the law, safety regulations are not absolutely
immune from takings, and where the line exists between immunity and takings will be decided
at a later date.
197. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389 n.10. The Court recognized that as a matter of law,
an illegitimate taking might not occur until the government refused to pay, but the interference
that effects a taking might begin much earlier, and compensation is measured from that time.
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property owner has exhausted all administrative remedies to invalidate
the regulation.198
Finally, commentators are divided on whether the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in First English will retroactively apply
to land use regulations enacted prior to the decision.1 99 The Court in
First English noted in its decision that since Pennsylvania Coal, the
established rule has been that when a regulation goes too far, a
taking will be recognized.2"' Further, the Court stated that the Con-
stitution has always required compensation in the event of a taking. 20
Therefore, a strong argument can be made that the Court in First
English was reiterating what regulatory takings law has always been,
thus allowing retroactive application of the decision to previously
enacted land use regulations.2°2 In the alternative, however, since
First English is a new United States Supreme Court decision, an
argument can be made that there will only be prospective application
to newly enacted legislation. 203
CONCLUSION
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles, the United States Supreme Court held that a regu-
lation which results in a temporary taking can require the payment
Id. See Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 (1984) (where government physically
occupies land without condemnation proceedings "the owner has a right to bring an inverse
condemnation suit to recover the value of the land on the date of the intrusion by the
Government .... ).
198. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985) (holding that federal courts should not adjudicate taking claims if state court compen-
sation claims have not been utilized).
199. Hearing, supra note 145, at 4-5.
200. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386.
201. Id.
202. Hearing, supra note 145, at 5.
203. Id. at 4. On August 13, 1987, the California Senate Committee on Local Government
held a hearing discussing possible legislation required after the recent Supreme Court land use
decisions. Id. at 1. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Benedictous, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). The committee
inquired whether new legislation would be required in California in response to these decisions.
Hearing, supra note 145, at 1. After hearing the testimony, the committee concluded that the
California legislature should wait until the cases are applied by the California courts before
enacting new legislation. Id. at 13. However, one suggested legislative enactment would shorten
the statute of limitations for inverse condemnation actions for regulatory takings. Id. at 14.
Since First English places the financial burden on the government during the period in which
the constitutionality of the regulation is being litigated, a shorter statute of limitations will
force private property owners to promptly litgate temporary regulatory taking claims. Id. at
4. This will also have the effect of limiting governmental liability for just compensation. Id.
At present, this appears to be the only legislative reaction in California to First English.
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of just compensation. The temporary taking, however, must deny
the landowner all reasonable use of the property. Thus, the fifth
amendment requires the state to provide just compensation for tem-
porary regulatory takings, as well as for temporary physical takings
or permanent takings. The United States Supreme Court, however,
limited First English to the facts presented. Further, the United States
Supreme Court did not state whether a valid safety regulation may
constitute a taking under the fifth amendment, as proposed by the
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. Rather, the
Supreme Court remanded to the trial court the issues of whether a
taking occurred and whether the County is insulated from liability
under the safety regulation exception to takings. The Court failed to
identify either how damages are to be calculated for temporary
takings, or the period for which just compensation is to be provided.
Even with these limitations, the United States Supreme Court may
be signaling the beginning of an era in which greater emphasis will
be placed upon private property rights and the Constitution will apply
to more severely limit governmental regulatory activity.
Ronald John Freitas
